What to Expect from the 2022 UAP Report

Last December the U.S. Congress passed the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which contained directives for how the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) must handle the UAP issue going forward. One of those directives requires an annual report due by October 31, 2022. This will be the second UAP report. The first UAP report, known as the Preliminary Assessment, was issued June 25, 2021. What will be in this new report? How detailed will it be? 

The 2022 NDAA contains thirteen basic requirements that the report’s authors “shall include,” which is a legal term that means “must include.” These are spelled out in Subsections A through P, each of which is listed below. Below I preview each element and provide some speculation about how the report might address the requirement. This speculation is guided by assumptions about how open or how secretive the authors might be with the public–a disclosure rubric. I hope this will help the public evaluate the impact of the 2022 UAP report, and also allow some fact-based judgments about the authors’ intentions toward disclosure. The rubric has three categories.  

Full Disclosure: The report reveals detailed underlying evidence pertaining to the “shall include” elements, as well as specific conclusions drawn from that evidence. This does not mean total disclosure of any and all information the government possesses about UFOs. We assume that the authors will constrain their report to the specific asks listed in the NDAA, as well as classification laws that forbid revealing intelligence gathering sources and methods. That aside, this category suggests an intention toward openness with the public. 

Partial Disclosure: The report provides general and generic discussion of the “shall include” elements, without offering any specifics. There may be acknowledgement that a situation is occurring, but no underlying evidence, and little to no analysis–in other words, similar to the 2021 Preliminary Report. This category suggests a muddled middle ground where the authors acknowledge a real phenomenon is occurring, but exhibit a continued extreme reticence to share details with the public.  

Full Secrecy: The authors simply decline to provide any information to the public for the “shall include” elements.   

Before we dive in, let’s look at who is writing this report. 

The 2021 Preliminary Assessment was authored by the UAP Task Force (UAPTF) and issued by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who leads the entire Intelligence Community. Just like the 2021 report, “the Director [of National Intelligence], in consultation with the Secretary [Defense], shall submit” the 2022 report “to the appropriate congressional committees.” So, DNI Avril Haines will issue both reports, and some reporting indicates that she is disclosure-friendly. Haines is the only member of the DoD or IC to sit for an news interview exclusively about UAP.

But there have been other personnel changes.

In 2021 the UAPTF was a very small office, with reportedly only two active members. Dr. Travis Taylor, an aerospace engineer with an open mind about UFOs, recently admitted to being one of the authors of the 2021 report. 

In December 2021 this office was converted into the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG), managed by DoD, specifically the Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence and Security (USDI&S). The office was not fully staffed for most of 2022. On July 20, DoD rebranded the office as the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), and announced Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick as its director. Presumably Kirkpatrick has spent his first three months on the job managing the completion of the new report. It’s unclear how much of the report he or others in AARO will have personally written or edited.   

I will be reading between the lines to detect any significant difference in tone and perspective between the two reports.  

The 2022 UAP Report Contents and Disclosure Rubric Scoring

Below you will find the NDAA language stipulating the thirteen requirements, followed by some context about the requirement, and speculation about what we might get in the report, using the disclosure rubric as a guide. 

Requirement #1: Tally of UAP Events

(A) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during the one-year period. (B) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than that one-year period but were not included in an earlier report.

This requirement is the accountability measure for the section of the law that requires “procedures to synchronize and standardize the collection, reporting, and analysis of [UAP] incidents,” and “to ensure that such incidents from each component of the Department and each element of the intelligence community are reported and incorporated in a centralized repository.” This ensures that Congress will receive those “timely and consistent” reports each year, and that if for some reason an incident was not reported or missed being included that year, it would be included in the following year. (Congress has also requested that they be notified more frequently through quarterly briefings). 

Subsection B requires inclusion of UAP events not included in the previous report, which has provoked much speculation about how far back the new report will go. Some hope that all the old classics, including Roswell, will be included. This seems unlikely, at least for this report.    

The 2021 Preliminary Report included data from November 2004 (the Nimitz Tic-Tac case) through March 2021. So one way to interpret subsection B is that the new report will contain data on cases from March 2021 through September or October 2022. It may also add any new cases from 2004 onward that have since surfaced. This would increase the standing tally of 144 UAP incidents. Back in May, Scott Bray of the Office of Naval Intelligence informed us the tally is now over 400. 

It is unlikely that AARO authors will interpret this language as a requirement or even an invitation to include UFO cases from deep in the 20th Century. The 2021 report explained why they are comfortable with 2004 and are likely to stick to that: 

The Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) considered a range of information on UAP described in U.S. military and IC (Intelligence Community) reporting, but because the reporting lacked sufficient specificity, ultimately recognized that a unique, tailored reporting process was required to provide sufficient data for analysis of UAP events. As a result, the UAPTF concentrated its review on reports that occurred between 2004 and 2021, the majority of which are a result of this new tailored process to better capture UAP events through formalized reporting.     

If Congress intended for an airing of all the “cold case” UFO files in this report, they would have explicitly done so. The Pentagon began collecting “flying disc” reports as early as January 1947. Exhuming all of them would require enormous effort and a tailored skill set, which may not be the best use of AARO resources at this point. This is why Congress has used the current Intelligence Authorization Act to require the Comptroller General to compile all of that historical data, but this report will not be due for another year.  

Full Disclosure: 

• The total number of UAP events in the given period, and the total number of standing events in their dataset  
• Some sort of date and location, even if it is general (e.g. August 2021, Pacific Northwest)
• An expansive rather than narrow interpretation of the time frame that should be covered by the report

Partial Disclosure: 

• The total number of UAP events in the given period, without reporting the exact total number of standing events in their dataset  
• No information about the date and location of events 
• A narrow interpretation of the time frame that should be covered by the report

Full Secrecy:

• Declines to provide any information about amount or frequency of UAP events in the given period

Requirement #2: Analysis, judgements, and explanatory categories

(C) An analysis of data and intelligence received through each reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related event. (D) An analysis of data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena collected through–(i) geospatial intelligence;(ii) signals intelligence;(iii) human intelligence; and(iv) measurement and signature intelligence.

Subsection C and D should be the heart of the 2022 UAP report. 

On the one hand, we can expect the least amount of detail about this requirement since it has to do with sources and methods of intelligence collection. On the other hand, the term “analysis of data” is the central task Congress is requiring from this report. Chairman Schiff reiterated this when he announced the May 17 public hearing on UAP: 

“The American people deserve full transparency–and the federal government and the Intelligence Community have a critical role to play in contextualizing and analyzing reports of UAPs.”

Like everything else in the military, the word “analysis” is codified with specific requirements. I have written about the IC’s Analytic Tradecraft Standards. Some of the most basic elements are:

“Analytic products should present a clear main analytic message up front… Language and syntax should convey meaning unambiguously…. and should not avoid difficult judgements in order to minimize the risk of being wrong.” 

An analytic product should include “key analytic judgments” defined as “conclusions based on underlying intelligence information, analysis, and assumptions.” Assumptions are defined as “suppositions used to frame or support an argument,” which also “affect analytic interpretation of the underlying intelligence information.” In other words, when the IC or DoD is asked to produce an analysis, they are being asked to craft an argument in response to a question. In this case, Congress’s questions are: What are UAP, and what risk do they pose to national security? 

So far, both the IC and DoD have declined to share with the public anything resembling a complete analytic product related to UAP. Whether in writing or public statements, including the May 17 congressional hearing, we have been told explicitly that the IC and DoD have made no judgements and no assumptions about the nature of UAP. In fact, they are suggesting it is simply not possible for them to make a judgment, nor is it their responsibility to do so. Will that change with the 2022 UAP report?  

One way it could change is if the report provides an update on how AARO is applying the five explanatory categories of UAP that were established in the 2021 report: “airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall ‘other’ bin.”    

As of now, of the 144 UAP cases in the 2004-2021 dataset, one UAP event is categorized as clutter, and the remaining 143 remain uncategorized. Has that changed? Has an analytic judgment been reached that any of the reported UAP are now thought to be foreign or domestic technology? Have any cases been tossed in the “Other bin”? The 2022 report should tell us.  

Full Disclosure: 

• A good-faith effort to apply the IC’s Analytic Standards, including judgments and assumptions
• A detailed description of at least some of the underlying evidence
• A clear enumeration of how many UAP events are attributed to any of the five explanatory categories 
• Some description of how each data collection method was used in relation to specific UAP events 

Partial Disclosure:

• A continuation of the stance that analytic judgements cannot be made at this time  
• Allude to underlying evidence without revealing any details 
• Refer to the five explanatory categories without enumerating how many UAP events are in each one
• A broad statement that states which data collection methods were used in the writing of the report  

Full Secrecy: 

• Completely ignore the requirement to provide an analysis of UAP data
• Decline to reference the existence of any underlying evidence
• Decline to mention any information about data collection, or which was used, if any. 

Requirement #3: Restricted airspace incursions (tally)

(E) The number of reported incidents of unidentified aerial phenomena over restricted air space of the United States during the one-year period.

The 2021 report emphasized that UAP are primarily observed over restricted airspace, and that they frequently interfere with military training and operations. This subsection requires DoD to state how many times that has occurred.  

Full Disclosure:

• The total number of incursions in the given period 
• Some sort of date and location, even if it is general

Partial Disclosure:

• A general reference to some amount of incursions without revealing the total number
• No information about the date and location of events 

Full Secrecy:

• Declines to provide any information about incursions

Requirement #4: Restricted airspace incursions (analysis)

(F) An analysis of such incidents identified under subparagraph (E).

There’s that word “analysis” again. The analytic standards should doubly apply to this section since one of the main purposes behind the standards is “to explain events or phenomena” so as to “imagine possible futures to mitigate surprise and risk.” UAP showing up in restricted airspace, swarming training ranges, and buzzing nuclear-powered aircraft carriers all suggest significant potential for surprise and risk.  

Full Disclosure:

• A robust discussion of the problem posed by UAP in restricted airspace and an attempt to make a judgment about what is happening 
• A detailed description of at least some of the underlying evidence

Partial Disclosure:

• A general mention of the problem without stating a judgment
• Allude to underlying evidence without revealing any details 

Full Secrecy: 

• Completely ignore the requirement to provide an analysis of UAP in restricted airspace
• Decline to reference the existence of any underlying evidence

Requirement #5: National Security Threat of UAP

(G) Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by unidentified aerial phenomena to the national security of the United States.

The 2021 report mentioned the national security implication of UAP only in one narrow context: 

UAP would also represent a national security challenge if they are foreign adversary collection platforms or provide evidence a potential adversary has developed either a breakthrough or disruptive technology.

In other words, of the five explanatory categories of UAP (“airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall ‘other’ bin.”) only foreign adversaries qualify as a threat. Based on how the DoD does threat analysis, UAP that are “Other” are not threats because we do not know their intentions. The big question: is this still the operable view?   

Full Disclosure:

• A full, candid explanation of how the DoD applies threat analysis to UAP events
• An enumeration of the national security threats that the DoD thinks UAP may pose, with some examples 

Partial Disclosure:

• Vague references to national security threats, lacking specifics

Full Secrecy: 

• No mention of national security threats posed by UAP

Requirement #6: Adversarial foreign governments

(H) An assessment of any activity regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that can be attributed to one or more adversarial foreign governments.

Full Disclosure:

• A clear statement of the DoD’s confidence in whether or not any observed UAP were “foreign adversary systems”
• Some discussion of underlying evidence  

Partial Disclosure:

• Decline to draw a conclusion about whether UAP were “foreign adversary systems,” due to lack of data or some other reason

Full Secrecy: 

• Decline to provide any statement about “foreign adversary systems”

Requirement #7: Breakthrough aerospace capability

(I) Identification of any incidents or patterns regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that indicate a potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved a breakthrough aerospace capability.

The 2021 report stated that the UAP office was in the process of “conducting further analysis to determine if breakthrough technologies were demonstrated.” It claimed that “a small amount of data” suggested this was the case, but that more “rigorous analysis are necessary by multiple teams or groups of technical experts to determine the nature and validity of these data.” Will the 2022 report reveal the outcome of those studies?  ​​

Full Disclosure:

• An update on current thinking on whether UAP exhibits “breakthrough aerospace capability” 
• A discussion of underlying evidence

Partial Disclosure:

• A continuation of the view that “breakthrough aerospace capability” is so far inconclusive  
• No underlying evidence is provided

Full Secrecy: 

• Decline to discuss “breakthrough aerospace capability” as a possibility 

Requirement #8: Coordination with allies

(J) An update on the coordination by the United States with allies and partners on efforts to track, understand, and address unidentified aerial phenomena.

Full Disclosure:

• A robust description of coordination efforts, including number and/or identity of partners 
• A discussion of the outcomes of those efforts, including evidence that has been shared

Partial Disclosure:

• A general mention that coordination has been attemption, without giving specifics 

Full Secrecy: 

• Decline to offer any information about coordination with partners to study UAP  

Requirement #9: Capture and exploit UAP

(K) An update on any efforts underway on the ability to capture or exploit discovered unidentified aerial phenomena.

This one is wild. Nothing even close to this is mentioned in the 2021 report. But there has been reporting about military efforts to interfere with UAP, and Congress is asking this question for a reason. Also recall that in conjunction with the 2021 report, the Deputy Secretary of Defense released a memo that ordered the UAPTF to “establish recommendations for securing military test and training ranges” from repeated UAP incursions. What were those recommendations, and were they implemented?   

Any attempts to shoot down or apply advanced technology against UAP are going to be highly classified. So subsection K could be a place where the report authors are not able to answer because the responsible military branch declined to provide any data.    

Full Disclosure:

• A direct answer as to whether DoD has attempted to “capture or exploit” UAP
• A discussion of what “capture” entails, and what “exploit” entails 

Partial Disclosure:

• Vague mention of such attempts, or a statement that no data was provided to corroborate such attempts

Full Secrecy: 

• Decline to offer any information about efforts to “capture or exploit” UAP

Requirement #10: Health-related effects of UAP

(L) An assessment of any health-related effects for individuals that have encountered unidentified aerial phenomena.

This is also an unprecedented question. It implies that members of the military have not only observed UAP, but been bodily affected by them. If the answer is yes, then the reality of UAP being truly “Other” would be pushed beyond doubt.  

Full Disclosure:

• An enumeration of the “health-related effects” with a description of each
• A description of the UAP events that led to the health effects, including date, location, circumstance 
• Some underlying medical evidence

Partial Disclosure:

• General mention of health effects, and/or a statement that UAP causing health effects is so far inconclusive
• No underlying evidence is provided

Full Secrecy: 

• Decline to provide any information about “health-related effects”

Requirement #11: U.S. nuclear technology and UAP

(M) The number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena associated with military nuclear assets, including strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships and submarines. (N) In consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena associated with facilities or assets associated with the production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons or components thereof. (O) In consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena or drones of unknown origin associated with nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Subsections M through O address U.S. nuclear technology, and together they represent one-fifth of the 2022 report. Of all of Congress’s requirements, these contain some of the most specific language. Congress wants to know more about the relationship between UAP and nukes. This section should cover a range of cases, from the 2004 encounter with the nuclear powered USS Ronald Regan, to domestic cases similar to the mystery drones observed over the Swedish nuclear plant in 2021. We can expect that very little of this will be included in the public version of the report, but what will be shared with the public on this topic?   

Full Disclosure:

• An full enumeration and analysis of all UAP incidents involving US nuclear technology, including general locations and dates (Provided to Congress in Classified form)
• A frank admission of the extent to which UAP incidents are related to US nuclear technology (provided to the public in Unclassified form)

Partial Disclosure:

• Vague, inconclusive reference to UAP and US nuclear technology

Full Secrecy: 

• Decline to provide any information related to US nuclear technology

Requirement #12: Line organizations providing UAP data

(P) The names of the line organizations that have been designated to perform the specific functions under subsections (c) and (d), and the specific functions for which each such line organization has been assigned primary responsibility.

This requires the report to list all the departments, service branches, and interagency partners that provide underlying intelligence on UAP events. 

The 2021 report had this to say on who was providing data:  

“The majority of UAP data is from U.S. Navy reporting. The UAPTF is currently working to acquire additional reporting, including from the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and has begun receiving data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).”

We later learned that the Navy provided all or nearly all of the data contained in that report. 

On the same day that the 2021 UAP report was released, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memo that formalized the UAPTF’s mission and ordered the “synchronize[d] collection, reporting and analysis on the UAP problem set.” The data collection plan was to be developed with each military Department and Command in coordination with the Intelligence Community through the DNI. As a result:  

“All members of the [DoD] will utilize these processes to ensure that the UAPTF, or its follow-on activity [AARO], has reports of UAP observations within two weeks of an occurrence.” 

If that in fact happened, the 2022 report should contain data from any part of the military or IC that reported a UAP from anywhere in the world (or above it) in the last year. Will it be more than just the Navy this time around? If so, might that result in a significant spike in the tally of UAP events?  

Full Disclosure:

• A list of all organizations who provided information used in the report, and a ratio of how much data came from each one.  
• Calls out any organizations that declined to provide UAP data 

Partial Disclosure:

• General statements about which organizations provided UAP data
• Unclear about the quantity of UAP data provided by each organization 

Full Secrecy: 

• Decline to mention the names of the organizations who did or did not provide UAP data

Requirement #13: Unclassified format

(3) Form.–Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Recall that the 2021 report was a public facing document. Congress received a classified version, which was released through a FOIA request nine months later. The classified version was not much longer, but all underlying evidence, and perhaps some analytic conclusions or assumptions, were carefully stripped out of the public report. Will that happen again?  

Full Disclosure:

• Most of the required elements are present in the unclassified report, and include as much  underlying evidence as possible
• There is minimal difference in the amount of information and its specificity between the unclassified and classified reports.  

Partial Disclosure:

• Most of the required elements are present in the unclassified report, but with significantly less specificity and little underlying evidence compared to the classified report

Full Secrecy: 

• The unclassified report is a short statement of submission containing little to no detail 

Once the 2022 UAP report is released, I intend to use this disclosure rubric to grade AARO’s transparency and sincerity vis-a-vis Congress’s intentions. Readers will be able to see for themselves where any sections of the report might fall short, or perhaps exceed expectations.  

If the report does err on the side of secrecy more than Congress intended, and more than the public deserves, the rubric score will establish a baseline that authors of future UAP reports can strive to rise above.